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Abstract
In New Keynesian models nominal rigidities determine socially ine¢ -
cient outcomes. Our paper reverses this view: properly designed monetary
policies may take advantage of predetermined nominal wages to discipline
monopolistic wage setters. This, in turn, requires accepting a non-zero in-
ation rate. Discretionary monetary policy is e¤ective when wage setters
are non atomistic. Ination targeting has real e¤ects irrespective of the
degree of labor market centralization.
Jel codes: E52, E58, J51; E24.
Keywords: ination bias, discretionary monetary policy, non-zero
ination targeting, unemployment, strategic wage setters.
1 Introduction
New Keynesian models provide a new perspective on monetary policy, ination
and the business cycle, based on exogenous monopolistic distortions in the goods
and labor markets. This literature, however, has little to say about long term
ination typically assumed to be zero despite overwhelming empirical evidence
of the contrary.
In this paper we derive ination and labor market distortions as joint equilib-
rium outcomes of a game between the wage setters and the central bank. We do
that by investigating the employment/output performance of alternative mone-
tary policy regimes at di¤erent degrees of labor market decentralization. Thus
The authors are grateful to P. Benigno, A. Cukierman, A. Dalmazzo, F. Giuli, S. Gnocchi,
L. Lambertini, D. Soskice and participants at the EEA 2008 Congress of Milan (Bocconi),
workshops on Central Banks, scal policies and unionized labor markets: the role of di¤erent
institutions(University of Rome La Sapienza, February 2008) and on Monetary policy and
the business cycle (University of Milano-Bicocca, September 2007) for useful comments on
earlier drafts. We acknowledge nancial support by MIUR (PRIN 2005). This research project
has also been supported by a Marie Curie Transfer of Knowledge Fellowship of the European
Communitys Sixth Framework Programme under contract number MTKD-CT-014288.
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our model accounts for both the relatively largetrade unions typically asso-
ciated to European labor markets in continental Europe and for the atomistic
wage setters popularized in New Keynesian models.
Previous studies outside the New Keynesian literature1 show that the mon-
etary policy regime, typically characterized by the central bank degree of con-
servativeness (Cukierman, 2004), a¤ects real variables when the labor market
is relatively centralized. Policy non-neutrality is obtained imposing ad hoc ob-
jective functions for either the trade unions or the central bank, or both. Our
contribution is based on the assumption that both the wage setters and the poli-
cymaker maximize a representative households utility. Ination costs therefore
reect preferences, technology and institutions, i.e. the features of the labor
market. The new results presented in the paper are linked to the size of such
costs.
A central tenet of the New Keynesian literature is that nominal rigidities
determine socially ine¢ cient outcomes. Our paper reverses this view: properly
designed monetary policies may take advantage of predetermined nominal wages
to discipline wage setters. This, in turn, requires accepting a non-zero ination
rate. Furthermore, the relative employment performance of a specic monetary
policy regime is conditional to the degree of competition in the labor market.
Consider discretionary monetary policy. With respect to the case of exible
wages, the combination of predetermined wages and discretion leads to an ina-
tionary equilibrium that partly disciplines largewage setters who anticipate
the inationary central bank response to distortions and the ensuing reduction of
real money balances. Note that the strength of the disciplining e¤ect is the same
for any non-zero value of real money balances in the utility function. Thus, the
widely popular practice of neglecting money balances when considering policy
analysis is misleading if wage setters are non atomistic.
The analysis of ination targeting is a key contribution of the paper. The
adoption of non-zero ination targets is increasingly popular among central
bankers, but the justication for this policy is hardly found in standard DSGE
models (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004). In our framework, due to predeter-
mined nominal wages and to the money-in-the-utility-function hypothesis, the
cost to the wage setters from imposing monopolistic distortions is increasing in
the target level. In fact they anticipate the negative impact of the wage markup
on consumption and, in turn, on real money balances. Such an e¤ect increases
with the level of expected ination, and unambiguously disciplines wage claims.
The key di¤erence with standard New Keynesian models is that the wage setters
internalize the consequences of their choice for their own future money holdings.
For this reason ination targeting has real e¤ects irrespective of the degree of
labor market centralization.
We are also able to show that the model is consistent with a number of
stylized facts concerning wage setting behavior, unemployment dynamics and
central bank policies. First, the implied wage markup in our model is coun-
tercyclical (as documented in Galì et al., 2007), just because ination is pro-
cyclical and ination expectations discipline wage setters. Second, calibrations
show that monetary discretion may have non-negligible e¤ects on unemployment
even when the number of wage setters is relatively high. Thus our analysis of
1See e.g. Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Soskice and Iversen (1998, 2000), Bratsiotis and
Martin (1999), Guzzo and Velasco (1999), Lippi (2003), Coricelli et al. (2006).
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discretionary ination equilibria may be relevant beyond the boundaries of con-
tinental Europe. Third, the di¤erential role of monetary policy non neutrality
may explain the di¤erent unemployment dynamics in Europe and in the United
States, following the 1980 disinationary episode.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 considers the case of exible wages. Section 4 computes the model so-
lution with pre-determined wages under discretionary monetary policy. Section
5 considers ination targeting. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We build on Neiss (1999) model, where a staggered timing structure in the
acquisition of nominal money balances within a money-in-the-utility function
framework generates a discretionary ination equilibrium when the economy is
plagued by monopolistic distortions.2 To simplify the analysis we assume full
price exibility in the goods market, whereas wages are predetermined.
2.1 Households
The representative household (i) maximizes the following utility function
U =
1X
t=0
t
 
lnCt;i   
1 + 
l1+t;i +

1  "

Mt;i
Pt
1 "!
(1)
where t 2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal discount rate, Ct;i is a consumption
bundle, lt;i is a di¤erentiated labor type that is supplied to all rms,
Mt;i
Pt
denotes
real money holdings.3
The ow budget constraint is:
Ct;i +
Mt+1;i
Pt;i
+
Bt+1;i
Pt
=
wt;i
Pt
lt;i +
Mt;i
Pt
+
 t
Pt
+ t +Rt
Bt;i
Pt
(2)
where Bt;i denotes holdings of one-period bonds; wt;i is the nominal wage;  t
is a lump-sum transfer from central bank prots, t denotes rms prots, Rt is
the nominal interest rate. Note that Mt+1;i is chosen at t.
Consumption basket and price index are dened as follows:
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct(j)
dj
 1
(3)
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt(j)

 1 dj
  1
(4)
2Albanesi et al. (2003) obtain similar results.
3New Keynesian models typically assume logarithmic preferences over real money balances
(Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001). Here we assume " > 1, which is su¢ cient to ensure that the
marginal cost to inating is positive in discretionary ination and that the solution to the
monetary authority problem in the game with the wage setters is always a global maximum
(see Neiss, 1999: 361, 368).
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The standard rst order conditions for consumption are:4
ct(j) = Ct

pt(j)
Pt
 1
 1
(5)
Ct =
1

1
Rt+1
Pt+1
Pt
Ct+1 (6)
The money demand equation is
Mt+1
Pt
=

Pt
Pt+1
 1 "
"
 
Ct
1 R 1t+1
! 1
"
(7)
As in Neiss (1999) the agent faces a trade-o¤ between t period consumption
and t + 1 period holdings of nominal money balances. Observe that (7) can
also be interpreted as a demand function: when the central bank increases next
period nominal money balances, coeteris paribus current consumption increases.
Straightforward manipulations would show that " denotes the inverse income
elasticity of money demand.
The condition about the optimal labor supply will be introduced at a later
stage, when we consider di¤erent wage-setting regimes.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms uniformly distrib-
uted over the interval [0; 1]. Each rm (j) produces a di¤erentiated good using
a Cobb-Douglas production function:5
yt(j) = lt(j)
 (8)
where
lt;j =
Z 1
0
lt;j(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
(9)
denotes a labour bundle and  is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution
across di¤erent labor inputs.
The price is set as a markup, 1 , over real marginal costs. For any given level
of its labor demand, lt;j , the rm must decide the optimal allocation across
labor inputs, subject to aggregation technology (9). Firm (j) demand for labor
type (i) is
lt;j (i) =

wt (i)
wt
 
lt;j (10)
where
wt =
Z 1
0
wt (i)
1 
di
 1
1 
(11)
is the wage index.
Aggregating across rms we obtain
4 Index i is dropped for simplicity.
5Capital is assumed xed and normalized to unity.
4
Yt = Ct = l

t (12)
lt (i) =

wt (i)
wt
 
lt (13)
lt =

1

wt
pt
  11 
(14)
2.3 Labor market
The economy is populated by n unions. Workers equally split across unions
(each union has mass n 1). The mass can be interpreted as the degree of wage
setting centralization as well as unionsability to internalize the consequences
of their actions (unionscoordination).
We assume that each union maximizes memberslifetime utility (1) subject
to the budget constraint (2) and to labor demand for all unions members. We
also assume that each union bargains over the real wage taking other unions
decisions as given. From equations (13) and (14) each union understands that
a real wage increase will trigger two adverse e¤ects: a substitution e¤ect, due
to the relative wage change, and an aggregate labour demand e¤ect, due to the
increase in the aggregate real wage. In fact, in the decentralized equilibrium
each union (z) anticipates that6
@wt
@wt (z)
= n 1

wt (z)
wt
 
(15)
2.4 Monetary policy
At time t the central bank sets next period money supply (Mt+1), facing the
budget constraint:
Mt+1  Mt =  t (16)
In the following we consider two policy regimes.
In the rst regime the central bank maximizes
UB =
1X
t=0
t
 
lnCt;i   
1 + 
l1+t;i +
B
1  "

Mt;i
Pt
1 "!
(17)
taking wages as given.
In traditional time-inconsistency models, the central banks aversion to in-
ation crucially a¤ects the outcome of monetary policy games. In our frame-
work equilibrium ination impacts on welfare through its negative e¤ect on real
money balances. Thus we di¤erentiate between: a) B = , which denotes the
6 In the literature it is sometimes assumed that unions bargain over the nominal wage. In
that case the union takes as given the nominal wage set by the other unions. Our choice is
justied here because the focus of the paper is on the strategic interaction between unions and
the monetary authority, via the real money balances e¤ect. The e¤ects of monetary policy on
nominal wage externalities and unionsinteractions are discussed in Lippi (2003), Coricelli et
al. (2006) or Acocella et al. (2008).
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standard case of discretion, where the central bank shares the representative
households preferences; b) B 6= , the case of distorted preferences, which
allows to replicate both Rogo¤s (1985) ination-conservative central banker
(B > ) and Guzzo and Velascos (1999) populist central banker (B < ).
The second regime we consider is commitment to a xed money growth rate,
m, i.e. commitment to an exogenous ination target (Svensson, 1997).
3 Equilibrium employment under exible wages
The exible wages provide a benchmark case for our analysis of the game with
pre-determined wages under the two monetary regimes above described.
In the case of exible wages the central bank sets money supply and the
unions choose wages simultaneously. As a result, monetary policy is neutral
and there is a Barro-Gordon ination bias.7
Regarding the employment determination, each union chooses the real wage,
wt (z), that maximizes (1), taking real money balances as given and subject to
the budget constraint (2).
The trade union rst order condition is
0 =
lt
h
  (   1) (n  1)  1 
i
Ct
+ 
l1+t
h
 (n  1) + 11 
i
wt
(18)
where subscripts z have been dropped since the symmetric equilibrium has been
imposed.
This implies that
wt = l

t Ct (19)
where:
 =
 (n  1) + (1  ) 1
(   1) (n  1) +  (1  ) 1 (20)
denotes the wage mark-up under exible wages. Observe that (20) is consistent
with alternative labor market regimes, ranging from perfect competition (n,
 ! 1,  = 1). to monopolistic competition (n ! 1, 1 <  < 1,  =
 (   1) 1), to strategic wage setting (1  n <1; 1 <  <1).
Using (14) and the goods market clearing condition Ct = Yt equilibrium
employment is:
l =



 1
1+
(21)
Observe that  1 denotes the labor and goods market wedge. The com-
petitive (Pareto optimal) level of employment obtains if  1 = 1.
4 Pre-determined wages and discretionary mon-
etary policy
When wages are pre-determined, the timing of the game is as follows. 1) Be-
fore the price level is known, trade unions must choose the nominal wage rate,
7 If the central bank sets money supply before the unions choose wages, the monetary
authorities anticipate that they cannot a¤ect output and thus set the ination bias equal to
zero by following the Friedman rule (see Friedman, 1969).
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wt = w
e
tP
e
t , where P
e
t is the rational expectation of the price level and w
e
t is the
desired real wage rate. 2) The central bank chooses its monetary policy. Then,
full price exibility ensures that markets clear. The model is solved by back-
ward induction. Relative to the case of wage exibility, unions now anticipate
the e¤ects of wage choice on ination and the equilibrium level of real money
balances in consequence of the central bank response.
We closely follow Neisssolution method. The central bank maximizes equa-
tion (1) with respect to Mt+1, taking wages as given.8 This is equivalent to as-
suming that ination is the control variable. For expositional purposes we dene
the ex post real wage, employment and consumption as functions of ination
surprises
wt
Pt
=
wetP
e
t
Pt
= wet
(1 + et )
(1 + t)
(22)
lt =

wet

1 + et
1 + t
  11 
(23)
Ct = Yt =

1

wet
1 + et
1 + t
  1 
(24)
where t, et denote ination and its rational expectation, respectively.
Bearing in mind that pt = wt l
(1 )
t , the central banks rst order condition
is:

1    

1  l
1+
t   

Mt
Pt
1 "
= 0 (25)
Condition (25) identies the marginal costs and benets of an expansionary
monetary policy. By raising next period money supply, Mt+1, the central bank
aims at an increase in current consumption at the cost of raising the disutility
from labor e¤ort and of reducing current real money balances, due to the surge
in ination.
The trade union problem is solved by choosing wet , i.e. the real wage that
maximizes the expected value of (1) subject to (15), (22), (23), (24), (25).
Under rational expectations and imposing the symmetrical equilibrium, the
rst order condition is
lt
h
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
i
Ct
= 
l+1t
h
 (n  1) + 11    
i
w
(26)
where
 =
1 + 
(1  ) ("  1)
captures the trade unionsanticipation of the central banks reaction to their
wage choices. In fact, the higher the real wage, the lower the level of employ-
ment, the more the central bank is willing to inate, reducing equilibrium real
money balances.
8 In this model there is no state variable to link periods and the policy problem is time
invariant; see Neiss (1999) for a discussion.
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Equation (26) implies that
wt = l

t Ct (27)
where
 =
 (n  1) + 11    
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
=   
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
(28)
Monetary policy is non-neutral because the wage setters anticipate the in-
ationary central bank response to their wage choice. The combination of wage
stickiness, concern for real money balances and discretionary monetary policy
can discipline the wage setters. This result holds for any positive even small 
value of real money balances in the utility function. Thus, the widely popular
practice of neglecting real money balances in welfare analysis is misleading when
wage setters are non atomistic.
Indeed, the moderating e¤ects of discretionary monetary policy are inversely
related to the number of wage setters. In fact, the wage markup (28) grows
monotonically with n and for n ! 1 the atomistic markup  1 is obtained,
but non-negligible e¤ects can be detected also for large values of n, as shown in
gure 1.9
About here Figure 1
We can now characterize equilibrium employment and ination. The solution
for equilibrium employment is:
l

=



 1
1+
> l (29)
Substituting (7), (12), (29) into the central banks rst order condition (25) we
get:
 =    1 +

1

 1
" 1


1  

1  

 "
" 1
l
| {z }
Bias
(30)
4.1 A quantitative assessment
It is often argued that money matters theoretically but its impact is empiri-
cally negligible (McCallum, 2002; Ireland, 2004). Thus to gauge the potential
relevance of our ndings, namely the disciplining role of discretion vis-à-vis the
exible wage regime, we consider a numerical exercise referred to two economies
where a di¤erent number of "large" unions operates.10 For the sake of exposi-
tion we refer to the United States and Europe over the period 1960-2000. Over
this period both countries scored a 6% unemployment rate and the ination
9 In the gure we plot the markup for some of the di¤erent values of  normally used in the
literature.  is set at 0:6. Observe that, for the parameterisation used in Figure 1 the exible
wage markup, , falls with the number of unions. When wages are predetermined, this e¤ect
is entirely reversed under monetary policy discretion.
10 Ireland (1999) shows that the U.S. ination-unemployment pattern is consistent with
Barro and Gordon (1983) theory of time-consistent monetary policy.
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rate amounted to 4% in the United States and to 5% in Europe. We proceed in
two steps (see the appendix for details of calibrations). First we set the almost
identical markups and the money scale parameter, , necessary to meet the ob-
served long run values of ination and unemployment in the two economies.11
Then we identify the di¤erent combinations in the degree of wage centralization
and in the labor elasticity of substitution, parameters n and  respectively, con-
sistent with the markups and with the assumed di¤erences in the two regional
labor markets. In our exercise Europe should identify the averageEuro-
pean country (EU henceforth) characterized by sovereign monetary policy
and country-specic labor market institutions.12
In Table 1 we present the gains from discretion, relative to the employment
loss (EL)13 and ination rates (INF) that would obtain under the markup rule
(20).
Table 1 Flexible vs. pre-determined wages
US EU
INF EL INF EL
Flexible wages 4.9 6.5 14.2 9.8
Pre-determined wages 4.0 6.0 5.0 6.0
It is striking that substantial gains accrue even in the case of the United
States. We test the robustness of the result by assuming alternative labor market
calibrations (see Table 2).
Table 2 Alternative (labour market) calibrations for the United States
Flexible wages Gains of discretion
Size of the representative union INF EL INF EL
0.6% (n=150) 4.6 6.3 0.6 0.3
0.5% (n=200) 4.4 6.2 0.4 0.2
0.25% (n=400) 4.2 6.1 0.2 0.1
0.16% (n=600) 4.1 6.0 0.1 0.0
Gains from discretion fall, but become negligible only for n > 200.
4.2 The e¤ects of distorted central bank preferences
We now consider the case of distorted central banks preferences. Straightfor-
ward manipulations show that equilibrium employment amounts to
l =



 1
+1
(31)
where
 =
 (n  1) + 11     B
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
(32)
11Admittedly, this model shares the widespread shortcoming that employment losses are
dened as a gap in hours per worker. Strictly speaking there is no unemployment, per se. See
Galì and Gertler (2007) for a discussion.
12Despite obvious di¤erences, we believe that European institutions share some features
that strongly di¤erentiate them from their US counterpart.
13The employment loss is dened as the deviation from the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
9
Thus by setting
B = 

B =

n+
h
 (n  1) + (1  ) 1   n
i
(1  )
(33)
distortions would be eliminated, and the ination bias would correspondingly
disappear. Choosing B <  reinforces the disciplining e¤ects of discretion,
because the central bank inates more in response to a wage increase when B
is low.
Our simulations, however, sound a note of caution. In Figure 2 we describe
the e¤ects of central banks conservatism (dened as B   ) on ination and
employment loss.
About here Figure 2
The Pareto optimum is achieved for B = 

B , but small deviations from this
value14 lead to catastrophic losses because of the non linearity of ination.15
5 Pre-determined wages and ination targeting
5.1 Derivation of the wage markup
Over the last decade central banks have shifted to a policy of announcing non-
zero ination targets. As acknowledged in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) the
justication for this policy is hardly found in micro-founded models. In the
following we show that commitment to a positive ination target may help to
discipline wage setters.
Suppose the central bank precommits to a constant growth rate of nominal
money balances, m. In our framework, this is equivalent to setting an ina-
tion target. The union now maximizes (1) subject to (7). Imposing rational
expectations (e = m and P et = Pt), the latter becomes
16
Mt;i
P et
=

Cet;i
1 +m  
 1
"
(34)
Unions anticipate that real money balances will fall due to the adverse e¤ect
of the wage choice on consumption. Formally, the unions rst order condition
in the symmetric equilibrium is:
lt
h
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
i
(1 + m)
Ct
= 
l+1t
h
 (n  1) + 11 
i
w
(35)
where the adverse e¤ect is measured by:
m =
1
"
"


1 +m  

" 1
C1 "t
# 1
"
which is increasing in m.17
14These could occur because of shocks or imperfect information about the model parameters.
Both features can be easily included in our framework.
15For more details on the gure see the Appendix.
16Equation (34) has been obtained using the Euler equation (6) under the expectation that
Ct = Ct+1.
17Recall that " > 1 for the marginal cost of ination to be positive.
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Straightforward manipulations show that
wt = ml

t Ct (36)
where:
m =

1 + m
=
 (n  1) + 11 h
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
i
(1 + m)
(37)
The e¤ects of the target are clearly summarized by m:
5.2 The rationale for e¤ectiveness of monetary policy
By comparing m to , i.e. ination targeting and the exible-wage cases, the
moderation e¤ect of the former is clear. Even though the benet of monetary
discretion is now lost, the ination target still disciplines wage claims.
The rationale is as follows. Under exible wages, the trade union optimiza-
tion problem is solved by choosing a real wage such that consumption falls below
the perfectly competitive rate. This loss of utility is more than compensated
for by the corresponding reduction in labour e¤ort. By contrast, when wages
are predetermined and the central bank adopts an ination targeting strategy,
real money balances fall due to the adverse e¤ect of the wage choice on con-
sumption. Unions anticipate this e¤ect and reduce real wages inducing agents
to work more, thus increasing real money balances and consumption. As the
ination target increases, the moderation e¤ect is stronger.
The size of moderation clearly depends on m. A striking result is that
the target has a disciplining e¤ect even in the limiting case of monopolistic
competition, due to the anticipated impact of wage claims on money holdings
(see equation (35)).
To support intuition, it is worth emphasizing the key di¤erence relative to
standard New Keynesian models incorporating nominal rigidities. In our frame-
work the wage choice is antecedent to consumption, employment and money
demand realizations, whereas under Calvos wage setting rule all these variables
obtain simultaneously to the optimizing wage setters decision.
In the following gure we describe the e¤ects of changes in  and n on the
employment loss associated to a 2% ination target.
About here Figure 3
Unlike the case of discretion, now the employment loss is highly sensitive to
changes in , whereas changes in the number of wage setters do not signicantly
a¤ect the results.
5.3 Ination targeting vs. discretion
Both discretionary policy and ination targeting tend to discipline wage setters
(see equations (28) and (36)). However wage moderation is driven by di¤erent
forces in the two regimes. The former works through the ination threat in
response to wage claims. The latter acts on the benet of holding money and
depends on the commitment to a higher rate of ination, which in turn will be
implemented by the credible central bank.
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In other words, discretion disciplines unions by the fear that the central bank
will inate after real wage expansions. By contrast, in the ination targeting
regime, the central bank credibly promises to hold ination at the target. This
disciplines the unions because the target a¤ects the marginal utility of real
money balances. As a result wage setters increase consumption by working
more.
Under discretion, the wage markup is moderated by unionsanticipation of
the central banks reaction and thus is inversely related to the number of unions,
fading away when this becomes very large. The e¤ect is independent of the real
money balance weight (), even if distorted preferences can a¤ect the outcomes.
The contrary is true for ination targeting, which instead holds also in the case
of perfectly monopolistic unions.
Table 3 reports calibrations of the employment loss di¤erentials associated
to ination targeting, relative to discretion, that arise as a consequence of the
target, starting from the standard zero-ination target, typically adopted in the
literature.18
Table 3 Di¤erences in employment loss
Non-atomistic wage setters
Ination target 20 25 50 75 100 200 300
0% -5.1 -1.9 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.9
2% -4.5 -1.3 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.5
4% -4.0 -0.8 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9
6% -3.6 -0.4 2.3 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.4
For a small number of wage setters ination targeting implies a worse per-
formance than discretion, and vice versa.19 Employment gains increase in the
level of the target.
The employment gain in setting a higher ination target is also sensitive to
the value of ". As depicted in Table 4, for each target the gains (with respect
to zero ination target) increase with ".20
Table 4 Employment gains (%) with respect to zero targeting
Ination target Inverse money elasticity (")
1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2
2% 0.87 0.82 0.76 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.47
4% 1.53 1.45 1.36 1.26 1.16 1.08 1.01 0.94 0.88
6% 2.06 1.99 1.87 1.75 1.63 1.52 1.42 1.33 1.25
5.4 Post-1980 disination and the labour market wedge
In this section we show that our emphasis on the role of largewage setters may
o¤er a re-interpretation of the post 1980 di¤erent unemployment performance
between Europe and the United States (Figure 4).
18 In order to isolate the e¤ects of the unionization from those arising from the ination
targeting, the table is built by calibrating the model to obtain in the discretionary equilibrium
an unemployment rate equal to 6% and an ination rate equal to 4% independent of the
number of unions. See the Appendix for details.
19An increase in the number of wage setters: an increase in the number of unions has a
very small e¤ect on the employment loss of the targeting regime, but it strongly reduces the
moderation e¤ect under discretion.
20 In our benchmark we have assumed " = 2:3.
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About here Figure 4
To explain these facts, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) argued that European
institutions performed relatively well in the 60s, when unemployment was in
fact lower than in the United States, but proved unsuitable for the new, more
turbulent macroeconomic environment following the oil shocks. This view was
challenged in Nickell et al. (2005), who identify a specic role of changing
institutions such as employment protection, unemployment benets, variation
in union density changes. According to their estimates, changes in labour market
institutions explain around 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the
1960s to the rst half of the 1990s.
We o¤er a complementary interpretation based on the concept of monetary
policy non neutrality. Both in the United States and in Europe, the turbulence
of the 70s caused an adverse shift in ination expectations. As documented
in Clarida et al. (1999) the early 80s marked a watershed in monetary policy,
as central banks in OECD countries committed to a low ination regime. Our
approach suggests that this induced an adverse e¤ect on the labor market wedge
and that such an e¤ect was stronger in Europe, due to the particular importance
of large wage setters.
The post oil shock ination averages for Europe and the United States are
quite similar. The former experienced an ination rate of 2:1% between 1982
and 2004 and in the latter ination in the same period was 1:9%. We thus
replicate our calibration experiment to obtain in both countries an ination
rate of 2% by changing the value of B . To obtain an ination rate of 2% we
x B equal to 0:7 in the United States and 0:76 in EU(case 1).
As a robustness check, we also consider two alternative policies: a 50%
increase in B (case 2) and B = 0:75 in both countries (case 3).
In Table 5 we document the di¤erent unemployment consequences of an
increase in central bank conservatism in the two regions. All cases imply a
similar result: European disination has a higher cost in terms of unemployment.
Table 5 Deationary policy shift
US EU
INF EL INF EL
Case 1 2.0 6.2 2.0 7.5
Case 2 1.0 6.4 2.4 7.3
Case 3 1.6 6.3 2.1 7.5
In our view this is line with the Nickell et al. (2005) results. In fact, our
model indirectly suggests that in a disination period large wage setters should
become more militant, i.e. union activism should increase.21 Furthermore,
the adverse changes in employment protection and unemployment benets that
contributed to raise unemployment could also be seen as the consequence of
trade unions pressure.
6 Concluding remarks
In contrast with popular wisdom, we suggest a reconsideration of inationary
equilibria. Instead of being the unpleasant by-product of imperfections, ination
21An emblematic cases of unionsactivism in the 80s are the Netherlands and Ireland (see
Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1997, Freeman, 2007).
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plays a positive role in disciplining wage claims. Properly designed monetary
policies may take advantage of predetermined nominal wages to discipline mo-
nopolistic wage setters. This, in turn, requires accepting a non-zero ination
rate. Discretionary monetary policy is e¤ective when wage setters are non atom-
istic, but ination targeting has real e¤ects irrespective of the degree of labor
market centralization.
Our results strongly support the European Central Bank choice of a posi-
tive ination target. In fact, with relatively smallwage setters an ination
targeting regime is preferable to a discretionary monetary policy. Since there is
little doubt that EMU has diluted the impact of wage choices of individual trade
unions on central bank policy, this may explain why the ECB has repeatedly
insisted on her commitment to the ination target.
Further research should be devoted to formal welfare analysis of an ination
targeting regime. Intuitively, the optimal ination target will be between the
Friedman deationary rule and the positive ination rate ensuring the achieve-
ment of the Pareto optimal employment.
Appendix
In this section we calibrate the model and investigate the quantitative relevance
of our theoretical results. We begin by modelling two hypothetical economies
characterized by a similar macroeconomic performance but substantially di¤er-
ent with regard to wage-setting behavior. We set baseline parameters consistent
with the long run macroeconomic performance of the United States and Europe,
in terms of ination and unemployment averages over the period 1960-2000.
Considering the former as a case of a country with a low union density and the
latter as a case of a more unionized area.22 In our exercise Europe should
then be identied as an averageEuropean country (EUhenceforth). Both
regions scored a 6% unemployment rate; the ination rate amounted to 5% in
the United States and to 4% in Europe.
In calibrating the model we follow a three-step procedure. We rst set
some common parameters in line with those used in the literature; then we set
the almost identical markups and the money scale parameter, , necessary to
meet the observed long run values of ination and unemployment in the two
economies; nally, we identify the di¤erent combinations in the degree of wage
centralization and in the labor elasticity of substitution, parameters n and 
respectively, consistent with the markups and with the assumed di¤erences in
the two regional labor markets.23
We set the labor coe¢ cient  at 0:6, the discount rate () at 0:97, cor-
responding to a yearly long-term real interest rate of 3%, the labor supply
elasticity (1=) at 0:47;24 and determine the scale parameter of labor disutility
22 In the US the number of unions a¢ liated to the AFL-CIO in the United States is about 50-
60. In major countries of continental Europe the number of industy unions ranges from about
15 in Germany to about 40 in Italy. In Europe, however, industry unions are heterogeneously
a¢ liated to di¤erent confederations and thus their action is partially coordinated. See Rhodes
(2001), Visser (2002, 2007).
23As said in the main text, in this model employment losses are dened as a gap in hours
per worker.
24Our results are robust to di¤erent reasonable specications of labor supply elasticity.
Evidence from microdata suggests a labor supply elasticity is mostly concentrated in the
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() to obtain a Pareto optimal level of employment equal to 1=3. We assume
the money demand elasticity (1=") to be 0:43.25 Given these assumptions, the
total markup (=) necessary to obtain the 6% unemployment rate in the two
countries amounts to 1:21. Finally, assuming discretionary monetary policy, we
set the money parameters consistent with the average ination rates observed
in Europe ( = 0:47) and in the United States ( = 0:56).26
Turning to our calibration of the two regional labor markets, we set n at 25
for the EUand 100 for the United States. Correspondingly, the values for 
are 5 and 9:6 respectively.
The common and country-specic parameters of our benchmark are summa-
rized by the following table.
Table 5 Parameters of our benchmark scenario
Common parameters
Labor coe¢ cient 0.6 Discount rate 0.97
Labor supply elasticity 0.47 Money demand elasticity 0.43
Non distorted employment 1/3 Price markup 1.10
Specic country parameters US EU US EU
Money scale parameter 0.56 0.47 Strategic wage setters 100 25
In our baseline calibration the wage markup is equal to 1:10.27 In Figure 2,
we have also considered the intermediate case of n = 50 (with  equal to 8).
In Table 3 we isolate the e¤ects of the unionization from those arising from
the ination targeting; given the degree of unionization (n),  and  are thus
chosen to obtain 4% ination and 6% unemployment; then in each column the
e¤ect of the targeting is compared. The table is calibrated for the case of
n = 100, i.e. the US.
Technical appendix
We have also checked the robustness of our results (by computing the exible
wage, discretionary and ination targeting equilibrium) with respect to other
standard functional forms for the agentspreferences. In particular, we solve
our model by considering a more general functional form for agentsutility func-
tion by assuming that the representative household (i) maximizes the following
utility function
U =
1X
t=0
t
 
C1 t;i
1   

1 + 
l1+t;i +

1  "

Mt;i
Pt
1 "!
(38)
range of 0:05-0:6. See Card (1994) for a survey. and Mulligan (1998, 2002) for a discussion.
25See e.g. Choi and Oh (2003), Dib (2004), Knell and Stix (2005) and references therein.
26Note that the money scale parameters, which are endogenously determined, are close to
those used by Christiano et al. (2005).
27We also test the robustness of our results by considering two alternative scenarios where
the parameters are the same as those reported in table 5, but the labor market elasticity of
substitution () is chosen to obtain di¤erent wage markups: 1:05 and 1:15. The former is
closer to the calibration for the United States of Christiano et al. (2005) whereas tha latter
to that of Gali et al. (2007).
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The standard rst order conditions for consumption are:28
ct(j) = Ct

pt(j)
Pt
 1
 1
(39)
Ct =
1

1
Rt+1
Pt+1
Pt
Ct+1 (40)
The money demand equation is
Mt+1
Pt
=

Pt
Pt+1
 1 "
"
 
Ct
1 R 1t+1
! 1
"
(41)
Agent faces a trade-o¤ between t period consumption and t+1 period hold-
ings of nominal money balances.
The rms optimization problem is una¤ected by considering (38). Instead,
the same it is not true for the unions and the central bank, as each union
maximizes members lifetime utility (38) subject to the budget constraint (2)
and to labor demand for all unions members.
Under exible wages each union chooses the real wage, wt (z), that maximizes
(38), taking real money balances as given and subject to the budget constraint
(2). In addition, each union (z) anticipates that @wt@wt(z) = n
 1

wt(z)
wt
 
. The
trade union rst order condition is
0 =
lt
h
  (   1) (n  1)  1 
i
Ct
+ 
l1+t
h
 (n  1) + 11 
i
wt
(42)
where subscripts z have been dropped since the symmetric equilibrium has been
imposed.
This implies that
wt = l

t C

t (43)
where:
 =
 (n  1) + (1  ) 1
(   1) (n  1) +  (1  ) 1 (44)
denotes the wage mark-up under exible wages. Observe that  is consistent
with alternative labor market regimes as mentioned in the main text.
Using (14) and the goods market clearing condition Ct = Yt equilibrium
employment is:
l =



 1
1++( 1)
(45)
Observe that the competitive (Pareto optimal) level of employment obtains
when the gross markup is equal to one, i.e.  1 = 1.
Now assume that wages are pre-determined, The central bank maximizes:
UB =
1X
t=0
t
 
C1 t;i
1   

1 + 
l1+t;i +
B
1  "

Mt;i
Pt
1 "!
28 Index i is dropped for simplicity.
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with respect to Mt+1, taking wages as given.
Bearing in mind that pt = wt l
(1 )
t , the benevolent central banks rst order
condition is:

1  C
1 
t  

1  l
1+
t   

Mt
Pt
1 "
= 0 (46)
The trade union problem is solved by choosing the expected real wage that
maximizes the expected value of (38) subject to (46).
Under rational expectations, the rst order condition is
lt
h
(   1) (n  1) + 1  +  ( 1)(1+)
i
Ct
= 
l+1t
h
 (n  1) + 11    
i
w
(47)
where
 =
1 + 
(1  ) ("  1)
captures the trade unionsanticipation of the central banks reaction to their
wage choices. In fact, the higher the real wage, the lower the level of employ-
ment, the more the central bank is willing to inate, reducing equilibrium real
money balances.
Equation (47) implies that
wt = l

t C

t (48)
where29
 =
 (n  1) + 11    
(   1) (n  1) + 1  +  ( 1)(1+)
<  (49)
The corresponding equilibrium employment is:
l

=



 1
+1+( 1)
> l (50)
Monetary policy is non-neutral because the non-atomistic wage setters an-
ticipate the inationary central bank response to their wage choice. The com-
bination of wage stickiness, concern for real money balances and discretionary
monetary policy always discipline the wage setters. This result holds for any
positive even small  value of real money balances in the utility function.
Equilibrium ination is easily obtained as:
 =    1 +

1

 1
" 1


1  

1  

 "
" 1
l
(" )
" 1
| {z }
Bias
(51)
29Note that  <  because   1. When  > n1+( 1)(1+) 1 the gross wage
markup may well fall below one! To completely remove distortions, including the e¤ects
of monopolistic competition in the goods markets, we need 

= 1, that is  =  =
n+[(n 1)+(1 ) 1 n](1 )
1+(1 )(1+) 1
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It is easy to verify that optimal delegation implies:
B = 

B =


1 +  (  1) (1 + ) 1

n+
h
 (n  1) + (1  ) 1   n
i
(1  )
(52)
By considering (52), similar results of those described in the main text hold.
Finally we consider the ination targeting assuming that the central bank
pre-commits to a constant growth rate of nominal money balances, m. The
union now maximizes (38) subject to the money demand condition (41). Im-
posing rational expectations (e = m), the latter becomes
Mt;i
Pt
=
 
Ct;i
1 +m  
! 1
"
(53)
Unions anticipate that real money balances will fall due to the adverse e¤ect
of the wage choice on consumption:
lt
h
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
i
(1 + m)
Ct
= 
l+1t
h
 (n  1) + 11 
i
w
where:
m =

"
"


1 +m  

" 1
C "t
# 1
"
Straightforward manipulations show that
wt = ml

t C

t (54)
where:
m =
 (n  1) + 11 h
(   1) (n  1) + 1 
i
(1 + m)
(55)
Similar results of those described in the main text hold.
Further results obtained by using numerical simulations are available upon
request.
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Figure 1 – Markups and non atomistic wage setters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Distorted preference (n = 50). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3 – Inflation targeting and parameters. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Unemployment rates in the United States and Europe. 
